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PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT: A FRESH LOOK AT AN OLD PROBLEM
A recent antitrust case raised two interesting questions that
have not yet been resolved. Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc.' was
a suit for treble damages brought under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.2 The plaintiff, Dailey, was a sales supervisor for Educational
Reader's Service, Inc. (ERSI) and was paid an annual salary plus a
commission of one per cent on all ERSI sales in his area. ERSI was
in the business of selling magazine subscriptions under a "school
plan" method, and its sales represented thirty-nine per cent of the
relevant market. Quality School Plan, Inc. (Quality) was ERSI's
major competitor with sales amounting to forty-three per cent of
the market. As a result of the acquisition of ERSI by Quality, Qual-
ity controlled eighty-two per cent of the "school plan" business in
the United States, with the balance going to Curtis Publishing Com-
pany. Dailey retained his job for about one year after the merger
and was then dismissed. He brought suit under section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act alleging the merger violated both section 1 of the Sherman
Act 3 and section 7 of the Clayton Act,4 and that he had lost his job
as a result of the unlawful merger. The district courts held that
Dailey was not protected by section 4 of the Clayton Act because
he had not been injured in his trade or business, and also because he
had not sufficiently alleged a causal connection between the merger
and his injury-i.e., his injury was a mere incidental result of the ac-
quisition. The court of appeals disagreed on both counts. Arguing
an additional ground for dismissal before the appellate court, the
defendant contended that section 7 of the Clayton Act is not an
anti-trust law within the meaning of section 4 of Clayton. Again the
court of appeals disagreed. This note will address itself to both these
issues and will attempt to suggest some improvements that should
be made in this area.
I. PERSONS PROTECTED BY SECTION 4 Or Tim CLAYTON AcT0
Section 4 of Clayton is in no way equivocal about who is en-
titled to maintain suit for treble damages:
1 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
2 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
8 Id. § 1.
4 Id. § 18.
5 Opinion unreported.
6 Leading articles on this same question include, Bergstrom, The Private Liti.
gant's Standing to Sue, 7 ANrirusT Buu,. 3 (1962); Clark, Treble Damages Bonanza:
NOTES 757
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
Partly because of their prior experience in the common law of
torts and partly because of the treble damage feature of the remedy,
courts hastened to read limitations into the statute. Justice Holmes
stated the principle normally applicable in tort cases when he said:
As a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property
of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another
merely because the injured person was under a contract with
that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong .... The law
does not spread its protection so far ....
And Judge Kirkpatrick expressed his concern about the treble dam-
age feature of the remedy when he noted:
In determining the scope of the Act it must be remembered
that the treble damage feature is an enforcement provision and
superimposes a penalty upon compensation. As such it should
not be literally construed if unreasonable results would be
reached by so doing. Obviously, there must be a limit some-
where.s
Other courts have mentioned the unfairness involved in permitting
those persons only incidentally injured to receive a windfall gain,9
the danger of the flood of litigation,'0 the burden placed upon in-
dustry,-" and the fact that more than one plaintiff might recover
treble damages for the same injury.'2
New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MxcMi. L. REv. 363 (1954);
Follock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-on Doctrine, 32 A.B.A.
ANTI sTr J. 5 (1966); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of
Damages in Treble Damages Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEo. ML. rL Rzv.
231 (1961); Whipple, Two Aspects of Plaintiffs' Treble Damage Suits: Class Actions;
Person Injured and Standing to Sue, 8 A.B.A. ANvrrRusr SECTIoN 27 (1956); Note,
Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 CoLur.
L. R v. 570 (1964).
7 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927).
8 Harrison- v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa.) afrd,
211 F.2d 405 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
9 Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass.
1956).
10 Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3rd Cir. 1910).
11 Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd.
211 F.2d 405 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
12 Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 823 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
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The statute sets out three conditions precedent to recovery. The
plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) that there has been a violation
of the antitrust laws; (2) that he has suffered an injury to his busi-
ness or property; and (3) that the injury was caused by the viola-
tion of the antitrust laws.18 The courts have generally construed each
of these elements in such a limited manner that large numbers of
plaintiffs are unable to withstand a motion to dismiss because they
lack "standing". 14 The first element is that plaintiff must allege a
violation of the antitrust laws. This will be treated later when sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act is considered. The second element is that
plaintiff must be injured in his business or property. Mere public
injury is not sufficient, for the government is charged with the re-
sponsibility of protecting the public.' Although there was some in-
itial confusion, 16 it is settled today that one's employment is his
"business". 1' The district court in Dailey appears to be wrong on
this point. Most of the cases that have denied standing to an em-
ployee have done so on the basis of proximate cause-indirectness of
injury-rather than on his lack of a business.' This leaves the most
troublesome of the three elements-proximate cause.
13 Some courts have attempted to add a fourth element to plaintiff's case by
requiring that he show an injury to the public. Shotkin v. General Elem. Co., 11
F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948); I.P.C. Distrib., Inc. v. Local 110, Chicago Moving Picture
Mach. Operators Union, 132 F. Supp. 294, 298 (N.D. Ill. 1955). However, when
there is a per se offense, no such injury need be shown. Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway.HNale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). And when the conduct is judged by the "rule of reason",
public injury must be shown before a violation of the law will be found. Thus
public injury is never a separate element in plaintiff's case.
14 In the first 50 years of the Sherman Act (1890-19,10), only 13 plaintiffs won
their suits for treble damages out of a total of 175 cases. S. OPrTNIIEIM & G. WEsroN,
FEDERAL ANTrrRuST LAws 874 (3rd. ed. 1968). During the period from 1952 to 1958,
plaintiffs had somewhat better success with 20 victories in 144 suits. And If settled
cases are included, plaintiffs stand about a 30.% chance of winning something. Dicks,
The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANrITur BULL,
5, 11, 14 (1959).
15 United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954); Revere Camera Co. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 81 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. 111. 1948).
16 See Corey v. Boston Ice Co., 207 F. 465 (D. Mass. 1913), where the court dis.
missed a suit by a plaintiff, who was a director and the president of the Independent
Ice Company and who alleged he lost both of these positions because of defendant's
illegal acquisition, on the ground that plaintiff had no "property right" in these posi-
tions. Id. at 466.
17 Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967), Vines v.
General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948); Roseland v. Phister
Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942).
18 Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951). Conira,
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NOTES
A stockholder of an injured corporation is denied standing be-
cause the injury was directed at the corporation rather than at the
stockholders; 19 a stockholder, creditor, officer, employee, and general
sales agent all rolled into one is denied standing because the injury
was to the corporation;20 a sole stockholder, officer, creditor, and
landlord is denied standing for the same reason; 21 a landlord, whose
rentals are diminished because of a conspiracy aimed at his tenant,
fails to establish standing;22 a supplier of an injured corporation
does not have standing;23 and an employee of an injured corporation
is denied standing.24 On the other hand, an exclusive sales agent for
an injured corporation is granted standing because he is injured in
his business;2 5 a stockholder who has suffered an injury to his stock-
holdings as a result of a conspiracy aimed at him has standing; 26 a
landlord who receives lower rentals because of a conspiracy aimed
at him, 2 7 or because of a conspiracy entered into by his tenant2 8 is
granted standing; an employee has standing when the illegal con-
spiracy is directed at him;29 and finally, one recent decision has al-
lowed standing to a principal stockholder, officer, and employee of
an injured corporation.30 As Judge Kirkpatric noted, it is virtually
impossible to reconcile all of these holdings with a general rule so
as to determine which injuries are too remote to bring the plaintiff
Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. N.Y. 1939),
aff'd per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of Am., 36 F.2d
959 (S.D. N.Y. 1929).
19 Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3rd Cir. 1910); Ames v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
20 Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of Am., 36 F.2d 959 (S.D. N.Y. 1929).
21 Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.
N.Y. 1939), aff'd per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
22 Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa.), afrd, 211
F.2d 405 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 US. 828 (1954).
23 Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962);
but cf. Sanitary Milk Producers v. Berijams Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir.
1966).
24 Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D. La.), alr'd, 323
F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963).
25 Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942). See also Vines v.
General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948); McWhirter v. Monroe
Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
26 Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1953); Rothberg
v. National Banner Corp., 259 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
27 Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
28 Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).
29 Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
80 Data Digests, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 36 U-S.W. 2425 (S.D. N.Y.
Dec. 30, 1967).
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within the scope of the Act.3 ' Probably the most that can be said is
that if the plaintiff is in competition with the violator, or if the
violator has aimed at him,82 or in some cases if the illegal conduct
has impaired plaintiff's business relations with the injured party, or
in even fewer cases, if plaintiff is in privity with the defendent, 88
he will have standing. A general trend is for the courts to become
more liberal with their standing requirements; this is especially true
in the employee cases. In the Dailey case, plaintiff's relations with
the injured party were severed as a result of the alleged violation.
While there is precedent going both ways in similar fact situations,
the decision in Dailey favoring standing appears to be supported by
the weight of authority, and is in line with current trends.
II. ELIMINATION OF MANDATORY TREBLE DAMAGES
Many have condemned the courts for creating such strict stand-
ing requirements. It is said that this has created unwarranted confu-
sion, has deprived deserving plaintiffs of their just rewards, and has
contravened Congress' intent in passing the Act. Undoubtedly the
requirement has created confusion and has deprived deserving plain-
tiffs, but it is not at all clear that Congress' intent has been ignored,
or that the courts have adopted an unsound policy in light of the
present law. One commentator has suggested that it is impossible to
determine Congress' intent in passing the statute, and that "[t]hose
who speak glibly of what Congress 'intended' are frequently telling
us more of their own views and predilections, rather than those of
Congress."3 4 And even if one desires to engage in such a guessing
game, the most logical conclusion is that Congress approves the
policy of restricting the scope of section 4 of Clayton. An identical
provision was first passed in 1890. 85 Almost immediately the courts
imposed strict standing requirements and Congress has not once
changed a word in the statute.
A far more productive pastime than conjecturing about Con-
gress' intent in 1890 is planning an effective course for the future.
31 Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (EmD. Pa.), afj'd,
211 F.2d 405 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
82 Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955); Pollock,
Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-on Doctrine, 32 A.B.A. AN-
TaRusT J. 5, 17-19 (1966).
33 Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (ED. Pa.), ali'd,
211 F.2d 405 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.. 828 (1954).
84 Pollock, supra note 32 at 8-9.
35 Sherman Act § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
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One writer suggests that the two tests for proximate cause should be:
(1) is the plaintiff within that class of persons entitled to protection
under the Act, and (2) is the injury of the type that the statute was
intended to guard against? As a supplement, the same writer sug-
gests there should be a presumption in favor of standing.3 8 Another
writer prefers the "target area test": (1) does plaintiff fall within
that category of persons toward whom the violation was generally
directed, and (2) is the harm of the type the statute was intended
to guard against?3 7 Of the two, the "target area" principle is prob-
ably the most acceptable. The "Columbia test" adds nothing to ex-
isting law except a nebulous presumption, which the courts may or
may not swallow. Proximate cause amounts to nothing more nor
less than a policy judgment for courts to make. The courts must de-
termine as a matter of policy whom they will protect and from what
type of injuries. In other words, since 1890 the courts have been
doing what the "Columbia test" asks them to do. The author of that
test merely disagrees with their answers. The "target area" test is an
improvement because it removes one factor from the realm of policy
and puts it into the area of fact finding-i.e., was the harm generally
directed at plaintiff. Thus, it would eliminate at least part of the
confusion.
But it would appear that the best solution would be for Con-
gress to remove the source of the trouble-mandatory treble dam-
ages. Kaysen and Turner (now Assistant Attorney General) have
recommended that treble damages should be given only in those
cases where the violation is wilful and would be subject to crim-
inal prosecution.38 This is an excellent proposition. At the same
time, Congress should make it clear that anyone who can show a
substantial economic injury, and who can further show that defend-
ant's violation was a substantial factor in causing that injury, is en-
titled to receive compensatory damages (trebled when the violation
3S Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
64 COLUm. L. Rev. 570, 587 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the Columbia test].
37 Pollock, supra note 32.
38 C. KAYSmN & D. TuP.NEi, ANx-=Tusr Poucy: AN EcoNo.esc AND LE.A., ANALYS=S
258 (1959). For other articles advocating such a change, see ATr'Y GENe. NAT'L COMM.
Ai-rrusr REP. 378-9 (1955) [hereinafter referred to as ATr'y G N. REP.] Bicks, supra
note 14. Contra, Lovinger, Private Action-The Strongest Piller of Antitrust, 3 A -y -
aRusT BuLL. 167 (1958); McConnell, The Treble Diimage Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50
Nw. U.L. Rxv. 342 (1955); Void, Are Threefold Damages Under the Antitrust Act
'Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. LJ. 117 (1939); Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage
Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A1.BA.J. 1061 (1954).
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is wilful), plus a reasonable attorney's fee and all the costs of the
suit.8 9 Congress should also make it clear that only the most frivo-
lous claims should be washed out at the pleading stage. Whether
plaintiff was "aimed at" or whether defendant could have forseen
the injury to plaintiff should be irrelevant in every case. In other
words, proximate cause would be entirely eliminated from the law-
only actual cause wold be considered.
Neither the "Columbia test" nor the "target area" test advo-
cates completely discarding proximate cause and probably most
courts would not be willing to do so. The argument today concerns
only the degree to which it should be used to deprive plaintiffs of
standing. As long as treble damages are mandatory, standing should
be limited. The remedy is "extraordinary". It works an extreme
hardship upon unwitting violators of the law, and the courts do and
should protect them when possible.40 The defenders of treble-dam-
age actions point out that they were intended to aid government en-
forcement, and that the government would have to quadruple its
antitrust budget to take up the slack in enforcement if the incentive
of treble damages were removed. Moreover, compensatory damages
are not sufficient to cover both the tangible and intangible factors
that accompany the loss of a business that one has worked a life-
time to build. There is more freedom and less governmental inter-
ference when private plaintiffs bring these actions than there would
be if the government were forced to step up its enforcement. Finally,
it is said that treble damage actions provide a greater deterrent to fu-
ture violations than government actions do, and the deterrent is
obviously greater than it would be if only compensatory damages
were awarded.
But these arguments are not convincing. The incentives to pri-
vate litigants are great now and they should become greater in the
future. The statute of limitations is tolled during the government
suit against the defendant, 41 a government victory against the de-
fendant is prima facia evidence of a violation in the private suit,42
proof of the amount of damages has been liberalized,48 and the plain-
39 Today not all costs are recoverable, as plaintiff is limited to "taxable costs".
See Lovinger, supra note 38 at 171.
40 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 45 F. Supp. 510, 514 (E.D.
Mo. 1965).
41 Clayton Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
42 Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
43 See Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562
(1931).
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tiff not only recovers most of his costs of suit, he also receives a rea-
sonable attorney's fee. An additional aid to plaintiffs could be en-
acted by requiring the government to file its evidence in court in
any case in which it allows a consent decree."4 This evidence would
be made available to private litigants. There are some telling statis-
tics on the effectiveness of treble damages. 45 Seventy-eight per cent
of private suits follow a government victory against the defendant
(this, of course, gives plaintiff his prima facia case against the de-
fendant.) From 1952 to 1958 plaintiffs lost 124 cases and only won
twenty. Seventy-two of the defeats were on a motion to dismiss. Dur-
ing the same period private litigants won eight suits for an injunc-
tion and lost only nine. Also, during the same period the govern-
ment won thirty-one cases and lost thirty-nine. Twenty-seven of these
government suits involved criminal charges and the standard of
proof was higher. Further, the government settles eighty per cent of
its cases-only the most difficult go to court. Bicks feels the dramatic
lack of success of private litigants in treble damage suits is due to the
strong distaste the courts have for the remedy. If success breeds in-
centive, the conclusion is inescapable that elimination of treble dam-
ages will increase the number of private actions brought. Thus it is
doubtful that the government would be forced to increase its en-
forcement of the laws as a result of this change in the law. But even
if this were the case, it is a poor justification for subjecting unin-
tentional violators to such harsh consequences.
There is not much that can be said to combat the argument
that compensatory damages will not compensate sufficiently. They
are supposed to achieve that result. Success in twerity of 144 suits
does not seem likely to compensate to any great extent. It is also
quite possible that jury verdicts will increase if the award is not
mandatorily trebled. And finally, there is little justification for treble
damages for an unintentional economic injury when our system
barely awards compensatory damages to the family of a pedestrian
who is killed by the negligence of an automobile driver. Treble
damages are not even mandatory when a person is intentionally
murdered.
The argument that treble damages are a deterrent to uninten-
tional violators of the law is just as weak. Again, success in twenty
of 144 cases does not seem too frightening. If the violators were
forced to think about the possibility of being held liable for any
44 Proposed by Lovinger, supra note 38 at 175.
45 Bicks, supra note 14.
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substantial injury to anyone they injure, and if they could not rely
on the motion to dismiss in these cases, the deterrent effect would
have to be greater than at present. Furthermore, many unintentional
violators do not even ponder about the antitrust laws and possible
violations thereof, so it is impossible to deter these persons even with
tenfold damages.
Mandatory treble damages have existed in our antitrust laws for
seventy-eight years, and except for situations like the electrical price-
fixing cases (wilful violations were involved), they have been in.
effective. Even in the electrical cases treble damages were not an
effective deterrent, they were only effective in providing compensa-
tion. It is time we give another system a chance to operate and prove
its worth. It could hardly be less effective.
III. SECTION 7 OF CLAYTON AS AN ANTITRUST LAW WITHIN THE
MEANING OF SECTION 4 OF CLAYTON
40
As was noted earlier, one of the elements of plaintiff's case
under section 4 is that he must prove that defendant has violated
one of the antitrust laws. This presents the complex issue of "what
constitutes a violation of the laws." Since the case of Gottesman v.
General Motors Corp.,47 the courts have also been struggling with
the collateral question' of "what constitutes an antitrust law." Before
Gottesman, most authorities had assumed without question that sec-
tion 7 of Clayton was an antitrust law and that an action for treble
damages would lie thereunder. The district court in Gottesman
noted that section 7 involves an "incipiency test"-i.e., is there a
reasonable probability that the acquisition will result in the con-
demned restraint of trade-and then went on to hold that "[p]lain-
tiffs cannot be damaged by a potential restraint of trade or monopo-
lization. There can be no claim for money damages for a violation
of section 7.48 This line of reasoning was quickly adopted by other
courts. 49 The position taken by these courts has two issues: the ques.
46 Other articles on this same subject include: Day, Private Actions Under Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 29 A.B.A. ANTmusr SEcriON 155 (1965); Guilfoil, Private Enforce.
ment of U.S. Antitrust Law, 10 Awrnrmsr BuLl 747 (1965); Note, Availability of Dives-
titure in Private Litigation As a Remedy for Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
49 MINN. L. Rxi. 267 (1964); 64 COLUm. L. REV. 597 (1964); 53 GEO. L.J. 1133 (1965);
79 HAv. L. REv. 445 (1965).
47 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. N.Y. 1963), cert. denied, 879 U.S. 882 (1964).
48 Id. at 493.
49 Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 728 (8th Cir.
1964) (dictum), Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D,
Hawaii 1964).
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tion of causation, and a purely legal issue of whether section 7 is an
antitrust law. The causation question is a mixture of proximate
cause and actual cause. As a matter of policy, the courts have de-
cided that section 4 was intended to protect plaintiffs from injuries
that result solely from restraints of trade. It is the restraint that is
condemned. Since a section 7 violation can be achieved by a mere
potential restraint of trade, the plaintiff cannot show any actual
causation between his injury and an existing restraint of trade or vio-
lation of the law. To bolster their position, these courts have also
decided that section 7 is not an antitrust law within the meaning of
section 4. The main support for this argument comes from the fact
that section 16 of Clayton50 gives private litigants the right to en-
join violations of the antitrust laws, "including sections two, three,
seven, and eight" of Clayton. If Congress considers section 7 an anti-
trust law, it certainly would not have felt the need to point out
specifically in section 16 that the injunctive remedy is available for
section 7 violations.
As was to be expected, other courts, including the Dailey court,
have not accepted this logic. 51 The Fifth Circuit in Dailey did not
elaborate on the issue; it merely noted that there was a conflict of
authority and that it believed the better view would include section
7 as an antitrust law for all purposes. Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn52 is
cited as authority for the proposition that an action under section 4
will lie for a violation of section 7, however, there is some doubt as
to whether it in fact did uphold such an action. The court laid down
two prerequisites for the civil suit: (1) plaintiff must show that the
acquisition did or might reasonably be expected to substantially
lessen competition; and (2) that he suffered some special damage
to his business or property as a result of that acquisition.5 3 But then
Judge Marovitz went on to state that plaintiff must show more than
just the fact that his injury resulted from "extraneous actions" by
defendant, the injury must result from the "lessened competition,
or monopoly itself". 5" This statement effectively destroys any notion
that an action will lie for a potential restraint of trade. Julius M.
Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc.55 is the other case cited in support of the
action under section 4 but that case was not entirely generous to
50 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
51 See Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. N.Y. 1965);
Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
52 2 4 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
53 Id. at 597.
54 Id.
55 240 F. Supp. 521 (SD. N.Y. 1965).
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prospective plaintiffs. The court justified its decision, and differen-
tiated Gottesman and the other opposing cases, on the ground that
plaintiffs allegedly lost their distributorships "substantially at the
moment" of the acquisition, and defendant's illegal conduct "cost
plaintiffs immediate and present damage."' 6 By distinguishing on
the basis that plaintiff suffered his injury "substantially at the mo-
ment" of the acquisition, the court intentionally or unintentionally
placed a severe restriction upon the action. In the Dailey case the
plaintiff could not recover under this rule, for he did not lose his
job until one year after the acquisition.
The Dailey court has gone farther than prior cases on this
issue. It is submitted that this is the better view in light of the word-
ing of the statutes. Section 7 is an antitrust law, plaintiff should
have a cause of action under section 4 if it is violated, and there
should be no greater requirements for proving a cause of action
under it than there are for proving a cause of action under section 1
of the Sherman Act. Indeed the burden of proof should be lighter
because of the "incipiency test". Section 1 of Clayton 7 defines "anti-
trust laws" as including "this act." New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.58 also defines "anti-trust laws" as
including the Clayton Act. It seems illogical and in direct conflict
with Congress' mandate to conclude any other way. And if section
7 is an antitrust law, there is no reason for distinguishing between it
and the other laws. If a merger violates section 7, and if plaintiff
is in fact injured in his business or property as a result of that
merger, whether it be on the day of the merger or one year later,
he should recover for that injury. He is not hurt by a potential re-
straint of trade, he is hurt by an illegal merger. Section 4 of Clayton
gives plaintiff the right to recover for any injury sustained "by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws". Congress did not
forbid "restraint of trade" in section 7, rather it forbade certain ac-
quisition which might have the effect of restraining trade. Plaintiff
should be permitted to recover for injuries caused by that forbidden
merger. The courts can still apply their normal standing require.
ments, and they can set up high standards for proof of actual injury.
But these issues must be distinguished from the issue of whether
an antitrust law has been violated. Sections 350 and 7 of Clayton
56 Id. at 524.
57 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
58 382 F.2d 346, 350 (3rd Cir.), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1964).
59 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
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have the same incipiency test; the courts have had no difficulty in
upholding treble damage actions alleging violations of that section.60
IV. RIGHT OF PRIvATE LITIGANTS TO SUE FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 7 OF CLAYTON ACT
Although it seems clear under existing law that private litigants
should be allowed to seek treble damages and an injunction 1 for
a violation of section 7, it is not at all dear that this is a good public
policy. Mergers are becoming increasingly vital in our economic
scene. Assuming that they are neither per se good, nor per se bad,
there is a need for some serious planning by our governmental agen-
cies as to which mergers should stand and which should fall. The
social, economic, and political factors that must be considered in
determining the net positive or negative effect of a given merger
are awesome in both their number and importance. The Attorney
General's Report listed some of the factors which must be consid-
ered: "(1) the character of the acquiring and the acquired companies;
(2) characteristics of the markets affected; (3) immediate changes
in the size and competitive range of the acquiring company; and (4)
the probable long-range effect that the acquisition may have on other
companies in the market, and upon those potentially in the market."
The report went on to say that "[w]e do not, of course, imply that all,
several, or any one of these guides may be significant in a given
case." 62 The committee is of the opinion that a careful analysis of
the economic and marketing problems involved must be made with
an understanding review of business conduct, and with a watchful
eye toward the public interest. The committee recommends that
these functions be given to well seasoned lawyers and economists
before they reach the hands of a "zealous prosecutor, bent solely
on court success."63 Private litigants and the courts are neither
qualified nor willing to make this demanding inquiry into the facts
of each case. The private litigant is interested solely in amassing dol-
lars in his own pocket-the public be damnedl The courts do not
60 Amplex of Md., Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir.
1967) (by implication); Alles Corp. v. Senco Prod., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964);
Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
61 United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954); Highland Supply Corp.
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Julius M. Ames Co. v.
Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
62 Arr'y GEN. REP., supra note 38 at 125.
63 Arr'y GEN. RE., supra note 38 at 358-9.
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havethe economic expertise to handle the job; 4 even if they did,
they have abdicated their responsibility.0 5 Fortas, now Justice Fortas
of the Supreme Court, points out that the Court will strike down
nearly every merger that is challenged if there is any proof of pos-
sible anti-competitive effects, without regard to whether the merger
is good or bad for the economy overall. He notes that this places a
profound obligation upon the Federal Trade Commission and the
Justice Department to carefully determine when and whether the
public interest will be served by attacking an acquisition. Their duty
is not to enforce laws and win cases, but rather they must engage in
economic regulation. 6 Bergson, a former Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, agrees. He indicates there are only two facts that are certain
in anti-merger law: (1) if the Supreme Court wants to strike down
a merger, it can find a way; and (2) it is going to want to strike it
down. 7 Oddly enough, the Justice Department and the Federal
Trade Commission have decreased their attacks on mergers almost
in proportion to their record of successes in court. They appear to
have heeded the advice of writers like Fortas and Bergson and have
assumed, to a great extent, the role of economic planners.0 8 But the
real danger lies in the area of private litigation. Although section 7
has not been used to a large extent by private litigants in the past,
the recent government victories against mergers have stirred up con-
siderable interest. Coupled with the lightened burden of proof (the
incipiency test) and the probable willingness of the courts to con-
sider section 7 an antitrust law, the new interest in using section 7
should be sufficient to awaken the "sleeping giant". Such a result
can only be disastrous.
Several plans have been submitted for keeping section 7 activity
in check. One writer suggests that private suits should be allowed for
section 7 violations, but the test of proximate cause should be nar-
rowly applied because the litigant may not be acting in the public
64 "To a large degree they [administrative agencies] have been a response to the
felt need of governmental supervision over economic enterprise-a supervision which
could effectively be exercised neither directly through self-executing legislation nor by
the judicial process." FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 184, 142 (1940).
05 Two recent cases by the Supreme Court have limited the scope of permissible
economic inquiry in order to lighten the burden of proof. United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 821 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 870 U.S. 294 (1962).
66 Fortas, Portents for New Antitrust Policy, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 41, 46-47 (1965).
67 Bergson, Merger Developments in the Supreme Court, 26 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SacrboN 238, 248-50 (1964).
68 See Day, supra note 46 at 159-60.
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NOTES
interest.69 The private litigant is never suing in the public interest
no matter how limited standing is made. He is suing solely for his
own benefit. Moreover, this plan will only serve to create artificial
boundaries and unnecessary confusion in the law. We have been
struggling with nonsensical 'standing requirements in other section
4 cases for seventy years, and we certainly do not need more prob-
lems of that nature.
Another writer suggests two plans.70 One plan would make a gov-
ernment victory against the merger a prerequisite to any private ac-
tion based upon that merger. While this may have its advantages,
it also has a very serious drawback in that it completely eliminates
the aid of private enforcement of section 7, thus placing a tremen-
dous burden upon the resources of the government. The other plan
involves a mandatory clearance procedure by the government of any
merger that exceeds 5 million dollars in combined assets. The parties
desiring to merge would be required to notify either the Justice De-
partment or the Federal Trade Commission. This body would
then make an investigation and decide whether clearance should
be granted. If it is, private litigants could not subsequently attack
the merger either for damages or an injunction. There are two pos-
sible forms of mandatory clearance programs: binding and non-
binding clearance. Since a good merger may turn sour with the pas-
sage of time, and since it is usually impossible to predict how a
seemingly healthy merger will work in operation, the binding clear-
ance procedure is not flexible enough. Once the decision is made
to clear a merger it cannot be revoked and nothing can be done to
correct the problem until the anti-competitive effects become great
enough to find an attempt to monopolize.
The non-binding clearance procedure would in essence be a
"negative clearance" program. If the government does not approve
of the merger, or if there are serious doubts about it, the government
would inform the parties of this fact. On the other hand, the merger
may appear to be a good one. In this situation the government does
not send a letter urging the parties to go full speed ahead; rather, the
parties are merely informed that at the present time no action is
planned. When the merger is disapproved, either the government
or private litigants are able to attack it if and when it is consumated.
When negative clearance is granted, private litigants cannot bring
suit unless that clearance is withdrawn at a later date. Anyone who
69 79 HAav. L. lux. 445, 447 (1965).
70 Day, supra note 46 at 160-62.
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feels that clearance should not have been granted or that it should
be withdrawn is free to inform the government of his complaint.
Or the government may act of its own volition and notify the parties
both privately and publicly that the merger is no longer considered
to be in the public interest and both the government and private
litigants will be free to attack it in the future. Litigants, of course,
will not be able to claim any damages which occurred while the
clearance was effective. The non-binding mandatory clearance pro-
cedure has the advantage of restricting private actions when it is
determined by a body of experts that the merger has sufficient socio-
economic justification, and the plan also makes it possible for the
government to be informed of every important merger that is about
to take place. Yet the clearance is not inflexible or irrevocable, and
the incentive to private enforcement is not hampered in any serious
manner if at all.
There are some details which would have to be worked out be-
fore such a plan could be enacted. One problem is whether there
should be a procedure whereby the parties to the merger could
protest to the government the decision to withdraw or deny clear-
ance. This might be desirable, although it is not absolutely neces-
sary since the parties still have ultimate recourse to the courts in
any event. Another problem is whether the Justice Department
should be given the power to issue clearance in conjunction with its
duties as a prosecutor, or whether a special agency of expert econo-
mists and attorneys should be established to deal with all clearance
questions. Since the number of mergers each year is large, it will
probably be necessary to increase the appropriations for investiga-
tion, and perhaps there should be a mandatory deadline which the
government must meet in either denying or granting clearance.
These and other special problems which might arise under a manda-
tory clearance plan are beyond the scope of this note, but certainly
they can be resolved.
A non-binding, mandatory clearance procedure cannot be
achieved without congressional action. But if Congress does act, it
could make one of the most significant contributions to our anti-
trust laws and to our economy since the enactment of the Sherman
Act in 1890.
William Isaac
